The Russian attack on Ukraine is presenting us with a terrible dilemma. We are subject to two impulses that are difficult to reconcile:
1. We feel deep outrage over Russia’s savage and unjustified attack on its innocent and peaceful neighbor. The barbaric, indiscriminate bombing of civilians, children, pregnant women, schools and hospitals. There are no words to describe Putin’s cruelty.
2. We fear that this conflict could escalate into global nuclear Armageddon.
In other words, there is widespread moral agreement, but disagreement about how to respond.
What Can the Civilized World Do?
Generally agreed upon are: Strong expressions of moral outrage, solidarity with the Ukrainian people, the provision of humanitarian assistance, exposure of Russian lies, hospitality and assistance to the millions of victims and refugees, economic and military aid to Ukraine short of direct NATO-Russia confrontation.
The next step is where divergence arises:
The two key elements of risk assessment are (1) the probability of a risk occurring, and (2) the magnitude of the risk. The greater the magnitude, the lower the probability should be. The probability of humanity committing nuclear suicide is such a risk. This is not a gamble we want to take, no matter how low its probability is.
Beating back the Russian war machine would require more than speaking out and providing hospitality to refugees. It would require waging war against Russia, with possible escalation to nuclear World War Three.
There are hawks and doves. Neo-liberals tend to be more hawkish: They are willing to take more risks than the doves. A dovish example is the FiveThirtyEight podcast of an interview of James M. Acton by Galen Duke. Acton is the co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: “Russia, Ukraine and the Risk of Nuclear War.”https://fivethirtyeight.com/videos/russia-ukraine-and-the-risk-of-nuclear-war/
There are hawks and doves. Neo-liberals tend to be more hawkish: They are willing to take more risks than the doves. A dovish example is the FiveThirtyEight podcast of an interview of James M. Acton by Galen Duke. Acton is the co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: “Russia, Ukraine and the Risk of Nuclear War.”https://fivethirtyeight.com/videos/russia-ukraine-and-the-risk-of-nuclear-war/
Acton presents a game-theoretical metaphor: Think of a chess game, where both sides have a button underneath the chess board, which, if pressed, blows up everything including both contestants. The most desirable outcome of a chess game is one where the winner’s victory is not so overwhelming as to lead either side to press the blow-up button.
Few wars end with one side’s complete annihilation (the US Civil War and the Punic Wars were exceptions). Most wars are won by one side in such a way as to allow the losing side to survive and to recover. And a key to this outcome is that it is based on negotiations.